Emissions Trading, Electricity Industry Restructuring and Investment in Pollution Abatement by Fowlie, Meredith
Emissions Trading, Electricity Industry Restructuring, and
Investment in Pollution Abatement
Meredith L. Fowlie
June, 2005
University of California Berkeley,
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics





Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics
Association Annual Meeting, Providence, Rhode Island, July 24-27, 2005
Copyright 2005 by Meredith Fowlie. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim
copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that
this copyright notice appears on all such copies.Emissions Trading, Electricity Industry Restructuring, and
Investment in Pollution Abatement
Meredith Fowlie1
June 2005
The NOx State Implementation Plan Call was designed to facilitate
cost e⁄ective reductions of nitrogen oxides emissions from large station-
ary sources (primarily electricity generators) through the introduction of
an emissions trading program. I investigate the relationship between eco-
nomic regulation and ￿rms￿long-run response to the incentives created by
this emissions trading program. I estimate a discrete choice model of the
￿rm￿ s compliance decision, controlling for unit-level variation in compli-
ance costs and using exogenous variation in state-level electricity industry
restructuring activity to identify an e⁄ect of electricity market regulation
on generators￿environmental compliance strategy choices. I present evi-
dence that di⁄erences in economic regulation across states have resulted in
a disproportionate amount of the mandated emissions reductions occurring
in more regulated electricity markets. Unfortunately, these are the areas
least in need of pollution control.
Emissions trading programs have become the preferred alternative to more tradi-
tional, prescriptive approaches to regulating point source emissions in the United
States. Currently, all of the major emissions markets are "emissions based": a permit
can be used to o⁄set a unit of pollution, regardless of where the unit is emitted. This
presumes that the health and environmental damages resulting from the permitted
emissions are independent of where in the regulated region the emissions occur. A
growing body of scienti￿c evidence indicates that this assumption is inappropriate in
the case of nitrogen oxides and mercury, two pollutants that have recently been regu-
lated under "cap and trade" (CAT) programs (Hubbard Brook Research Foundation,
Mauzerall et al..).
The vast majority of the emissions currently regulated under CAT programs
come from electricity generators.2 Asymmetries in state electricity industry regula-
1tions have the potential to interfere with permit markets￿ability to allocate emissions
reductions e¢ ciently. This research addresses two questions: did economic regula-
tion in electricity markets a⁄ect how coal plant managers chose to comply with a
regional NOx emissions trading program, and did inter-state variation in electricity
industry regulation exacerbate the ine¢ ciencies associated with an emissions based
permit market design that fails to re￿ ect spatial variation in marginal damages from
pollution.3
The NOx State Implementation Plan (SIP) Call was designed to facilitate cost
e⁄ective emissions reductions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) from large stationary sources
through the introduction of an emissions trading program. In the period between
when the SIP Call was upheld by the US Court of Appeals (March 2000) and the
deadline for full compliance (May 2004), ￿rms had to make costly decisions about
how to comply with this new environmental regulation.
NOx emissions contribute to the formation of ozone.4 High ambient ozone con-
centrations have been linked to increased mortality, increased hospitalization for respi-
ratory ailments, irreversible changes in lung capacity, reductions in agricultural yields
and increased susceptibility of plants to disease and pests. The NOx SIP Call was
designed to help northeastern states come into attainment with the Federal 1-hour
and 8-hour federal ozone standards of 120 ppb and 80 ppb respectively.
Ground-level ozone in the eastern United States has a lifetime of about 2 days
(Fiore et al..). Surface ozone concentrations are a function of both in situ ozone pro-
duction and pollutant transport; both are signi￿cantly a⁄ected by prevailing meteo-
rological conditions. Figure 1 illustrates how, during high ozone episodes, signi￿cant
portions of the northeast can fail to attain the Federal standard(OTAG). The dashed
line outlines the 19 state region regulated under the NOx SIP Call. The arrows repre-
sent transport wind vectors. Many states that are in attainment with Federal ozone
2standards were included in the SIP Call program because their NOx emissions con-
tribute to the non-attainment problems of downwind states. Although some states
contribute signi￿cantly more than others to the non-attainment problem, the NOx
SIP Call applies uniform stringency across all 19 states. The states that have been
identi￿ed as relatively "high damage" in terms of ozone exposure (Krupnick, Mauzer-
all) are also states that have restructured (and thus reduced the degree of economic
regulation in) their electricity industries.
The NOx SIP Call mandated a dramatic reduction in average NOx emissions
rates. Major changes have been underway to make sure that coal plants regulated
under the program achieved compliance by the deadline.5 To comply with the regu-
lation, ￿rms can do one or more of the following: purchase permits to o⁄set emissions
exceeding their allocation, install NOx controls to reduce emissions or reduce produc-
tion at dirtier plants during ozone season.
There are several reasons why coal plants operating in regulated electricity mar-
kets might have been more likely to adopt more capital intensive compliance strategies
(such as major pollution control technology retro￿ts), as compared to similar plants
operating in restructured electricity markets.6 Regulators in unrestructured markets
have authorized rate increases and cost recovery clauses to allow utilities to recover
their investments in NOx control technology retro￿ts (Business Wire, Charleston
Gazette, Megawatt Daily, PR Newswire, Southeast Power Report, Platts Utility and
Environment Report 1999, Platts Utility and Environment Report 2000, Platts Util-
ity and Environment Report 2002, Platts Utility and Environment Report 2003).
In restructured markets, plant owners must recover their environmental compliance
costs in the wholesale spot market, or in long term supply contracts that are based
on expected spot prices. Consequently, ￿rms cannot be certain that they will be able
to recover large capital investments in abatement technology retro￿ts, nor can they
3appeal to public interest arguments (such as cleaner air or construction job creation)
to justify receiving higher prices for their electricity. Merchant plants and other gen-
erators that rely heavily on the wholesale electricity market to recoup their pollution
control investments will be particularly reluctant to adopt a compliance strategy that
involves large investments in abatement equipment. Unlike utilities, many merchant
plants had low credit ratings in the years leading up to the SIP Call (Senate Com-
mittee on Energy and Natural Resources). Highly leveraged plants would have more
di¢ culties securing ￿nancing for major pollution control retro￿ts, which can cost over
$50M per unit.
The objective of this paper is to estimate a discrete choice model of ￿rms￿com-
pliance decision in order to test the hypothesis that the type of electricity market in
which a coal plant is operating has signi￿cantly a⁄ected the environmental compli-
ance strategy choice. Using unique data on unit-level compliance costs, a conditional
logit model and a random parameter logit model of the compliance choice are esti-
mated. Results indicate that electricity market regulation signi￿cantly a⁄ected how
coal plants made their environmental compliance choices.
For decades, economists have studied the relationship between economic regula-
tion and the investment decisions of regulated ￿rms. In their seminal paper, Averch
and Johnson demonstrate how rate of return regulation7 provides ￿rms with an incen-
tive to overintensively substitute capital for other production factors. A large share
of the regulation literature has been devoted to extending and testing Averch and
Johnson￿ s work. Empirical veri￿cation of this e⁄ect in the context of the electric-
ity industry has been attempted several times with mixed results: Courville, Spann,
and Hayashi and Trapani all ￿nd support for the Averch-Johnson e⁄ect in the U.S.
electricity industry, whereas Boyes does not.
With the creation of the Acid Rain Program (ARP) in 1990, researchers became
4interested in the e⁄ect of economic regulation on electricity generators￿compliance
choice between SO2 pollution permits, fuel switching and a more capital intensive
compliance alternative- installing scrubbers. Using single agent models of the compli-
ance decision, Bohi and Burtraw conclude that the compliance choice will be distorted
if variable and compliance costs are treated asymmetrically in rate base calculations,
while Fullerton et al. show how state Public Utility Commission (PUC) rules that
distort investment incentives could more than double the cost of compliance. Other
researchers have used partial equilibrium models of the permit market to analyze the
e⁄ect of PUC regulation on permit market outcomes (Coggins and Smith, Cronshaw
and Kruse, Winebrake et al.). These studies predict that the performance of permit
markets will depend importantly on how rate of return regulation treats compliance
costs, and that rate of return regulation that favors capital intensive compliance op-
tions will limit permit market e¢ ciency.
Once the Acid Rain Program came into e⁄ect in 1995, economists could em-
pirically analyze how generators respond to the incentives created by this emissions
trading program. In general, results have been mixed. Some studies ￿nd little or no
evidence that PUC regulations biased generators in favor of installing scrubbers (Bai-
ley, Keohane). Other researchers do ￿nd that cost recovery regulations signi￿cantly
discouraged participation in the permit market (Arimura, Rose); this e⁄ect is found
to be particularly strong in states where there was uncertainty about the extent to
which generators would pe permitted to recover costs of purchasing permits, and in
states with deposits of high sulfur coal.
This paper di⁄ers from previous studies of the relationship between economic
regulation and environmental compliance decision in two important ways. First,
to my knowledge, this is the ￿rst paper to use inter-state variation in electricity
industry restructuring activity to identify an e⁄ect of electricity market regulation on
5generators￿choice of compliance strategy. Because the ARP began before electricity
restructuring got underway, all ￿rms made their compliance choices in a regulated
electricity industry environment; variation in economic regulation across electricity
markets was limited to di⁄erences in PUC cost recovery rules and coal protection
measures.8
The piecemeal, state-by-state approach to electricity industry restructuring in
the US has since resulted in considerable inter-state variation in electricity market
structure which I can exploit in the interest of identifying an e⁄ect of electricity
market regulation on ￿rms￿choice of compliance strategy. Uncertainty with regards
to the status of restructuring in the states a⁄ected by the SIP Call had been largely
resolved by March of 2000 when the courts upheld the NOx SIP Call and the terms of
compliance were ￿nally established. Between 1994 and 1998, all 19 states that were
ultimately included in the NOx SIP Call held hearings to consider restructuring their
respective electricity industries. By 1999, restructuring bills had been passed in 12 of
these states and D.C. By 2000, the remaining 7 states had all resolved not to move
forward with electricity restructuring (EIA).9
The second factor that distinguishes this work from earlier papers looking at
compliance decisions under the ARP has to do with the regional nature of the ozone
non-attainment problem. Whereas the documented ine¢ ciencies resulting from the
regulation of compliance cost recovery under the ARP were limited to regulated ￿rms￿
overinvestment in pollution control (i.e. the aggregate emissions reduction target
is not achieved at least cost), in the case of the SIP Call NOx market, additional
allocative ine¢ ciencies arise if the ￿rms who are biased towards investing in capital
intensive pollution controls are located in areas where the marginal health bene￿ts
from pollution reduction are relatively low.
Health and environmental consequences could be signi￿cant if asymmetries in
6regulatory incentives across electricity markets have resulted in a disproportionate
amount of the mandated NOx emissions reductions occurring in regulated electricity
markets where ozone non-attainment is less of a problem. A recent study ￿nds that
shifting 11 tons of NOx emissions per day from a relatively "low damage" location
(North Carolina, a state that has not restructured its electricity market) to a "high
damage" area (Maryland, a state that restructured its electricity industry) over a
ten day period could result in the loss of approximately one human life (Mauzerall
et al.). An average unit in the sample emitted 15 tons of NOx per day in 1999;
retro￿tting a single unit with the most capital intensive NOx control option results
in daily reductions of 12 tons on average.
In the next section, I present a simple theoretical model of the compliance deci-
sion. I then describe the data and the empirical framework for assessing the relation-
ship between economic regulation in the electricity market and ￿rms￿environmental
compliance decisions. Section 5 summarizes the results. Section 6 concludes.
The ￿rm￿ s compliance choice
This section describes a simple model of a plant manager￿ s choice between J mutually
exclusive approaches to complying with the NOx SIP Call. The purpose of specifying
the model is to provide a framework to test the hypothesis that the structure of the
electricity market in which a unit is operating signi￿cantly a⁄ects a ￿rm￿ s choice of
compliance strategy.
Two factors that are likely to ￿gure signi￿cantly into a plant manager￿ s compli-
ance decision are the up-front capital costs associated with retro￿tting a plant with
a particular NOx control technology, and the anticipated variable compliance costs
(i.e. the costs of operating the control technology plus the cost of purchasing required
permits per kWh of electricity generated). The capital costs, variable operating costs
7and emissions reduction e¢ ciencies associated with di⁄erent compliance alternatives
vary signi￿cantly, both across control technologies and across generating units with
di⁄erent technical characteristics.
Let Jn represent the compliance strategy choice set for the nth ￿rm. Using
detailed unit-level data, estimates of capital costs and variable compliance costs can
be generated for each of the f1::Jng compliance alternatives, for all N ￿rms.10 Figure 2
is a graphical representation of the compliance choice faced by a unit drawn randomly
from the sample. Each of the nine points plotted in ￿xed cost ($/kW)/variable cost
(cents/kWh) space corresponds to a di⁄erent compliance technology or "strategy".
Variable costs include the costs of operating the control technology, plus the costs of
purchasing permits to o⁄set emissions.11
A compliance-cost minimizing plant manager will want to choose a compliance
strategy corresponding to one of the points lying along the lower "compliance frontier"
that is approximated by the broken line in ￿gure 2. Points lying to the right of this line
are not cost minimizing.12 Points to the left would result in non-compliance (the plant
would not be purchasing enough permits to o⁄set its emissions). Larger emissions
reductions are associated with more capital intensive compliance strategies along the
steeper portion of the compliance frontier. Retro￿tting a unit with Selective Catalytic
Reduction (SCR) technology can reduce emissions by up to 90%. NOx emissions rates
can be reduced by as much as 35% through the adoption of Selective Non-Catalytic
Reduction Technology (SNCR) (EPA, 2003). Pre-combustion control technologies
such as low NOx burners or combustion modi￿cations can result in emissions rate
reductions ranging from 15-50%, depending on the boiler (EPA, 1998, EPA, 1999,
EPRI).
Let the ￿xed capital investment associated with retro￿tting unit n with NOx
control technology i be Kni; let vni represent the variable operating costs, (including
8the costs of purchasing permits to o⁄set emissions) that the manager of the nth unit
expects to incur having retro￿tted his unit with technology i. I de￿ne a compliance
frontier function Kn(vni): I assume: K0
n(vni) < 0;K00
n(vni) ￿ 0 because the compliance
frontiers of all the units in the sample are negatively sloped and convex to the origin.
The location of each point on a generator￿ s compliance cost frontier is determined
by pre-retro￿t characteristics of the unit (such as nameplate capacity, ￿ring type,
furnace dimensions, etc.), the expected permit price and expected future production
levels. For the purpose of modeling the compliance decision, I assume that the plant
manager can choose any point on its continuous, convex compliance frontier Kn(vni):
In the empirical model, the decision is represented more realistically as a choice among
discrete points that de￿ne the frontier
I assume that plant managers minimize the present value of expected compliance
costs subject to the constraint that the chosen compliance strategy must lie on the
least-cost compliance frontier Kn(vni): Let Cni represent the compliance costs that
the manager of the nth unit expects to incur, having adopted compliance strategy i.
I assume that the variable and capital compliance cost components enter additively
















where vni = Vni + ￿mni: The manager expects to produce qnt kWh of electricity in
time t.13 Vnit represents the anticipated variable costs of producing electricity while
operating control technology i, net of permit purchases. I assume that all ￿rms are
price takers in the permit market; the permit price ￿ is assumed to be exogenous
to the ￿rm￿ s compliance decision. The unit￿ s permit allocation is Ant; the post-
retro￿t emissions rate is mni: The total capital cost is equal to the installation cost
9Kni, multiplied by the interest cost of holding capital sn: The coe¢ cients ￿
v and ￿
K
indicate how the ￿rm weights capital costs and variable operating costs respectively
in the compliance decision.
When comparing the costs and bene￿ts across compliance alternatives, any terms
that do not di⁄er across alternatives will not come to bear on the compliance decision.
I assume that the manager chooses vni to minimize the following levelized annual











(1 + rn)Tn ￿ 1
: (3)
The Qn denotes the quantity of electricity (in kWh) that the manager expects
the nth unit to produce in an average ozone season.13 The levelized annual cost factor
ln is a function of the ￿rm￿ s discount rate (rn) and investment time horizon Tn.











The manager will want to choose the point on the compliance curve where the
(negative) slope is equal to the ratio of the cost of an incremental change in variable
compliance costs and the cost of an incremental change in ￿xed compliance costs. A




n ) will cause the ￿rm to choose a point on the compliance
frontier where the slope is more (less) steep. Similarly, an increase in the cost of
capital or levelized cost factor will, ceteris paribus, be associated with a less capital
intensive compliance choice.
10To the extent that regulation in the electricity market signi￿cantly a⁄ects the
capital and variable compliance cost coe¢ cients, plants with identical compliance
choice frontiers will make di⁄erent compliance choices in di⁄erent electricity market
environments.
Compliance Choices in Unrestructured Markets
In unrestructured electricity markets, the cost coe¢ cients used by regulated ￿rms
could have been signi￿cantly in￿ uenced by PUC regulations governing capital and
variable cost recovery. There are a variety of ways in which regulated utilities can
seek to recover their ￿xed and variable environmental compliance costs. Rate base
adjustments have been requested in order to recover the costs of capital required to
make investments in NOx control technology, to recover compliance related increases
in operating expenses, and to reasonably compensate shareholders for exposure to risk
by allowing them to earn a return on equity. Companies have also sought approval for
various kinds of rate adjustment "trackers" to allow them to recover costs associated
with purchasing NOx permits and construction work in progress.14
A review of the industry press indicates that regulators have authorized rate
increases and various cost recovery trackers to allow utilities to recover investments
in NOx control technologies in the seven states that are regulated under the SIP
Call and that have not enacted electricity industry restructuring (Business Wire,
Charleston Gazette, Megawatt Daily, PR Newswire, Southeast Power Report, Platts
Utility and Environment Report 1999, Platts Utility and Environment Report 2000,
Platts Utility and Environment Report 2002, Platts Utility and Environment Report
2003). Anecdotal evidence suggests that regulated utilities have been permitted to
earn a positive rate of return on their investments in abatement equipment and have
typically been permitted to recover a signi￿cant portion of variable compliance costs.
11In some states, legislation has been passed to make it easier for regulated utilities to
recover their environmental compliance costs. 15
One approach to modeling the compliance decision in regulated markets assumes
that managers of regulated plants maximize shareholder pro￿ts subject to the con-
straint that they remain in compliance with environmental regulations (Fullerton et
al.). In this model, ￿
V
n represents the portion of variable compliance costs (not includ-
ing the opportunity costs of using the permits it has been allocated) that the utility
is not permitted to pass on to its ratepayers through rate increases; 16 ￿
K
n represents
the portion of capital investments in NOx control technology that is not included in
the rate base. If the regulated rate of return on capital exceeds the cost of capital,
the regulated ￿rm will be biased towards capital intensive compliance options.
Alternatively, the compliance choice in regulated market can be modeled as a risk
(versus cost) minimizing choice (Rose). In this model, uncertainties regarding how
PUCs will treat future permit purchases could bias ￿rms towards cleaner, more capital
intensive options (i.e. ￿
K < ￿
v)(Bailey, Burtraw). Finally, several researchers found
that state environmental regulations and coal protection policies were an important
factor in ARP compliance decisions (Arimura, Coggins and Swinton, Keohane). If lo-
cal environmental quality or construction job creation concerns were a factor in PUCs￿
rulings regarding cost recovery, costs associated with SCR technology (the compliance
alternative that delivers the most signi￿cant emissions reductions and requires more
substantial retro￿ts) may be treated more favorably in rate base calculations.
The Compliance Decision in Restructured Markets
Restructured electricity markets consist of buyers and sellers whose bids determine
a wholesale market price. Because the costs of storing electricity are prohibitively
high, supply and demand for electricity are balanced in real time. Trading occurs via
12bilateral contracts, in day ahead markets and through spot markets or "real time"
transactions. Generators submit bids (prices and quantities) that they are willing to
produce; Independent system Operators (ISOs) combine these bids into an aggregate
supply curves and intersect this curve with demand. Energy and reserve markets
clear intermittently throughout the day. Units are dispatched so as to meet load at
least cost, subject to system security, stability and transmission constraints.
Three ISOs operate centralized power markets in the region regulated by the
SIP Call17, all operate as uniform price auctions. For generators operating in these
regions, the extent to which the electricity price they receive will increase to re￿ ect
or track their environmental compliance costs is determined not by a regulator, but
by the wholesale electricity market. The e⁄ect of the manager￿ s choice of vni on the
average wholesale price she receives per kWh ￿ Pn will depend on how the increase in
marginal operating costs a⁄ects the position of the nth unit in the order of dispatch.
Whereas ￿rms in more regulated markets can pass a signi￿cant portion of variable
and capital compliance costs through to electricity customers, ￿rms in restructured
electricity markets must recover capital and variable compliance costs in the wholesale
spot market or in long term supply contracts that are based on expected spot prices.
This suggests that ￿rms in restructured markets will be more cost sensitive when
making their compliance decision (i.e. the ￿
K and ￿
v coe¢ cients will be larger in
absolute value), as compared to ￿rms facing similar compliance frontiers who are
subject to rate of return regulation.
In the years leading up to the NOx SIP Call, credit rating changes in the energy
sector were overwhelmingly negative.18 This trend has a⁄ected generators operating
in restructured industries disproportionately. While the credit ratings of merchant
energy companies and some companies with a signi￿cant degree of non-core activities
have fallen drastically, most regulated utilities have been a⁄ected to a far lesser extent
13(Business Wire, 2001; Business Wire, 2004a; Business Wire, 2004b;Platts Utility
Environment Report, 2002, Business Wire 2003). This has likely made securing
￿nancing for a large capital investment in NOx control technology more costly for
￿rms in restructured electricity markets. Concerns about maintaining shareholder
value could also bias management against compliance alternatives that require large,
up-front capital investments.19
Data and Preliminary Evidence
Data description
Information about which compliance strategies were chosen by coal plant managers
was obtained from the Environmental Protection Agency, the Energy Information
Administration, the Institute for Clean Air Companies and M.J. Bradley and Asso-
ciates. The data set includes the 702 coal ￿red generating units that are regulated
under the NOx SIP Call. Of these, 326 are classi￿ed as "regulated" for the purpose of
this analysis. "Regulated" plants include those subject to PUC regulation in states
that have chosen not to restructured their electricity industries, and a state owned
and operated facility operating in a restructured market. The results presented here
are generated using data from 588 units. I am awaiting data on 46 units. Compli-
ance costs for the remaining 68 generating units cannot be generated due to data
limitations.
I do not directly observe the variable compliance costs vij and ￿xed capital costs
Kij or the post-retro￿t emissions rates mij that plant managers anticipated when
making their decisions. I can, however, generate unit-speci￿c engineering estimates
of these variables using detailed unit-level and plant-level data. In the late 1990￿ s, to
help generators prepare to comply with market-based NOx regulations, the Electric
Power Research Institute20 developed software to generate cost estimates for all major
NOx control options, conditional on unit and plant level characteristics.21 I use
14this software to generate variable costs and ￿xed cost estimates for each unit, for
each viable compliance option. Cost estimation requires detailed data on over 60
operating characteristics, fuel inputs, boiler speci￿cations, plant operating costs, etc.
Post-retro￿t emissions rates are estimated using the EPRI software, together with
EPA￿ s Integrated Planning Model (EPA 2003). A more detailed data appendix is
available upon request from the author.
It is impossible to directly observe plant managers￿expectations regarding ozone
season production levels Qn under di⁄erent compliance strategy scenarios. Because
coal generation tends to serve load on an around-the-clock basis, the production levels
of the plants in this sample are less likely to be signi￿cantly a⁄ected by changes in vari-
able operating costs (as compared to intermediate and peak load units). Anecdotal
evidence suggests that managers used past summer capacity factors to estimate fu-
ture production levels, independent of the compliance choice being evaluated (EPRI,
1999). I observe unit-level hourly production over the period 1997-2005. I assume
that managers used past summer production levels to proxy for expected ozone season
production. This assumption is discussed in more detail in the Appendix.
Summary Statistics
Figures 3 and 4 summarize the observed choices for units in restructured and un-
restructured markets in terms of MW of installed capacity (87, 828 MW in regulated
markets and 88,370 MW in restructured markets).22 A signi￿cantly larger propor-
tion of the coal capacity in unrestructured markets has been retro￿t with SCR ( the
control option that delivers the most signi￿cant emissions reductions). Conversely,
in restructured markets, a greater proportion of capacity has either not been retro-
￿tted, or has been retro￿tted with controls that can achieve only moderate emissions
reductions (such as combustion modi￿cations or SNCR). These preliminary results
are consistent with the predictions of the model.
15There are several reasons why we might observe asymmetries in compliance strat-
egy choices across states. It could be that the costs of installing SCR were lower for
units in unrestructured electricity markets. These di⁄erences could also be explained
by di⁄erences in generating unit characteristics (for example, older plants might be
less likely to make large capital investments in pollution controls).
Table 1 presents summary statistics for unit level operating characteristics that
signi￿cantly a⁄ect compliance costs: nameplate capacity, plant vintage, pre-retro￿t
emissions rates, pre-retro￿t heat rates and pre-retro￿t summer capacity factor. Units
in restructured markets had lower pre-retro￿t emissions rates on average. Because of
persistent air quality problems in the northeast, plants in this region have historically
been subject to more stringent pollution regulation prior to the SIP Call. With
respect to other important determinants of compliance costs such as capacity, age
and technology type(not summarized here), the two subpopulations of coal units look
very similar.
Table 2 presents estimated capital and variable costs for the most commonly
adopted NOx control technologies. Average costs are very similar across the two
electricity market types, but are slightly higher for units in more regulated electricity
markets. This is likely due to the fact that plants with higher pre-retro￿t emissions
rates tend to have higher retro￿t costs.
Empirical Framework
Summary statistics suggest that it is unlikely that the di⁄erences in compliance strat-
egy choices that we observe across electricity market types can be explained entirely
by di⁄erences in unit characteristics and compliance costs. In this section, I develop
an empirical framework for testing whether regulation in the electricity market sig-
ni￿cantly a⁄ected the environmental compliance choice.
16There is arguably a dynamic component to the compliance strategy choice; man-
agers could purchase permits to o⁄set their emissions in the early years of the program
and defer the decision to make major capital investments in emissions controls un-
til they had more information about permit market conditions and pollution control
technologies. This analysis focuses exclusively on the compliance choices that were
made in the years leading up to the compliance deadline (i.e.2000-2004). These deci-
sions will likely determine regional emissions patterns to a signi￿cant extent for the
foreseeable future. Because these choices were ineluctably made in a very short time
frame, they can be modelled as static decisions.
Each plant manager (indexed by n) faces a choice among Jn compliance strat-
egy alternatives. With the obvious exception of the "no retro￿t" option, all of the
observed compliance strategies chosen by plant managers involve some combination
of 8 di⁄erent NOx control technologies. Although there are 15 compliance "strate-
gies" represented in the data set, the most alternatives available to any one unit is
10. Some control technologies are only applicable to certain types of boilers.23 Other
technology combinations were excluded from the choice set if the unit had already
installed the technologies prior to 2000.
The compliance cost that the nth manager associates with a given strategy i is
comprised of two components: a non-stochastic component that depends on observ-
able characteristics and a stochastic component:




n Kni + "ni; (5)
The estimated variable cost (per kWh) of operating the control technology is Vni.
The estimated variable costs associated with o⁄setting per kWh emissions with per-
mits is equal to the permit price ￿ multiplied by the post-retro￿t emissions rate mni;
17vni = Vni + ￿mni: The estimated capital costs of installing the technology is Kni: I
assume that the manager chooses the compliance strategy that minimizes expected
compliance costs. As it is likely that the compliance choice characteristics that are
relevant to the compliance decision are not limited to the attributes we observe, tech-
nology speci￿c constants ￿i are included to improve the ￿t of the model. These ￿xed
e⁄ects capture unobserved, intrinsic technology preferences or biases, such as widely
held perceptions regarding the reliability of a particular NOx control technology. Be-
cause this decision depends in part on unobserved factors, it is impossible to say with
certainty which compliance strategy a ￿rm will choose. An extreme value stochas-
tic component "ni is included in the model to capture the idiosyncratic e⁄ect of the
unobserved factors.
I ￿rst estimate a conditional logit (CL) model of the compliance choice. Let ￿
0xni
represent the deterministic component of Cni. Let Yn denote the nth ￿rm￿ s chosen
alternative. The "ni are assumed to be iid extreme value and independent of ￿ and
xni. The probability (conditional on ￿) that the nth ￿rm chooses compliance strategy
i is the standard logit probability (McFadden) :








The most restrictive speci￿cation of this CL model imposes homogeneity in re-
sponses to changes in capital and variable compliance costs; the ￿ coe¢ cients are not
allowed to vary across plants. A second speci￿cation captures systematic variation
in the ￿ parameters by interacting observed plant characteristics with compliance
choice attributes. To facilitate a test of the hypothesis that ￿rms in di⁄erent types of
electricity markets weigh cost components di⁄erently in their compliance decisions,
18capital cost and variable compliance costs are interacted with a restructured electricity
market dummy. Because older plants can be expected to use shorter investment time
horizons (and thus weigh capital costs more heavily), the capital cost variable is also
interacted with plant age. Conditional on observed unit characteristics, coe¢ cients
are not permitted to vary across plants.
The advantage of the CL model is its simplicity, which facilitates hypothesis test-
ing and the estimation of con￿dence intervals. However, to the extent that there is
unobserved heterogeneity in how plant managers respond to choice attributes, errors
will be correlated and CL coe¢ cient estimates may be signi￿cantly biased. The ran-
dom parameter logit (RPL) model does a better job of accommodating unobserved
response heterogeneity. The presence of a standard deviation of ￿ allows coe¢ cients
to vary across plants and facilitates a test of whether managers value cost compo-
nents uniformly versus di⁄erentially.24 In the RPL model, the coe¢ cient vector ￿n
is unobserved for each n and varies in the population with density f(￿j￿): I main-
tain the assumption that the unobserved stochastic term "ni is iid extreme value and
independent of ￿n and xni.
The data used to estimate the model has an unbalanced panel structure. While I
only observe one compliance choice for each coal-￿red boiler, an electricity generating
facility or "coal plant" can consist of several, independently operating generating
"units", each comprised of a boiler (or boilers) and a generator. Some facilities only
have one boiler, but there can be as many as ten boilers at a given plant. I assume that
the same manager made compliance decisions for all boilers at a given facility. The ￿
coe¢ cients are allowed to vary across managers, but are assumed to be constant over
the choices made by a manager. This does not imply that the errors corresponding
to all choices faced by a single manager are perfectly correlated; the independent
extreme value term still enters for each choice.
19Conditional on ￿n, the probability that a manager of a facility with Tn regulated
units makes the observed Tn compliance choices is:












where i is a Tn ￿ 1 dimensional vector denoting the sequence of observed choices.
Unconditional choice probabilities are derived by integrating conditional choice prob-
abilities over the distribution of unobserved random parameters (Train, 2003). The
￿ vector of unknown parameters describes the distribution of ￿. The parameter esti-














Jnt is the number of viable compliance alternatives available to unit t operated by
manager n. Because this integral does not have a closed form solution, the uncon-
ditional probabilities are approximated numerically through simulation. For each
decision maker, R draws of ￿ are taken from the density f(￿j￿);one for each decision
maker. For each draw, the value of [7] is calculated for each decision maker. The
results are averaged across draws. Simulated maximum likelihood estimates of the


















To increase the accuracy of the simulation, 1000 pseudo-random Halton draws are
20used (Train, 1999). The program that estimates the RPL model is based on GAUSS
code developed by Train, Revelt and Ruud (1999).
Estimation
Conditional logit model results
Results for three models are presented in Table 3. To estimate standard errors, the
robust asymptotic covariance matrix estimator is used (Mc Fadden and Train). The
￿rst column corresponds to the most restrictive, benchmark CL model in which coef-
￿cient values are not permitted to vary across plant managers. All of the technology
speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects are negative, all but the low NOx burner (LNB) ￿xed e⁄ect are
signi￿cant at the 1% level. This suggests that, relative to the baseline option of no
control technology retro￿t, the average manager was biased against adopting these
technologies (controlling for costs).
The variable operating cost and capital cost coe¢ cients are also signi￿cant at the
1% level and have the expected negative sign, suggesting that an increase in either
capital or operating costs signi￿cantly reduces the probability that a given compliance
alternative will be chosen. The ratio of the variable cost and ￿xed cost coe¢ cients is
3.75, suggesting that plant managers are, on average, willing to pay an additional $1
in capital costs so as to reduce annual ozone season operating costs by $3.75.
The second column of Table 4 presents the results from a nested likelihood ratio
test of this benchmark speci￿cation. The test statistic is larger than the ￿2 statistic
with 2 degrees of freedom and a p-value of 0.001. This indicates that variable op-
erating cost and capital cost variables signi￿cantly improve the ￿t of the model (as
compared to a model that includes only technology ￿xed e⁄ects).
The second CL model (CLII) accounts for systematic di⁄erences in responsiveness
to variation in capital and variable compliance costs. The second column of Table 3
reports results for the second CL model. To account for the possibility that ￿rms in
21di⁄erent types of electricity markets might weigh choice attributes di⁄erently, variable
and capital cost variables are interacted with an electricity market structure dummy
that equals one if the plant is operating in a restructured electricity market and is
not state owned and operated, zero otherwise. Because older plants can be expected
to use shorter investment time horizons, the theoretical model predicts that older
plants will weigh capital costs more heavily in their compliance decisions ( @ln
@Tn < 0).
To allow the capital cost coe¢ cient to vary with plant age, I include an interaction
term in both models. The youngest plant in the sample was built in 1996; plant age
is de￿ned as vintage year-1996.25
The age-capital cost interaction terms are both signi￿cant and have the expected
negative sign. The older the plant, the shorter the investment time horizon, the
more signi￿cant the e⁄ect of an increase in capital costs on choice probabilities. The
age-capital cost coe¢ cient is found to be signi￿cantly more negative among units
operating in restructured markets. Somewhat surprisingly, the coe¢ cient on the un-
interacted capital cost variable is not signi￿cant, implying that an incremental change
in capital costs does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect the probability that a control technology
will be adopted at a very young plant. This "baseline" capital cost coe¢ cient, (i.e.
the average value of the coe¢ cient for very young plants) does not di⁄er signi￿cantly
between restructured and regulated markets. These results imply that among units
of similar age, larger negative capital cost coe¢ cients are associated with units in
restructured markets. Although both the variable cost and the variable cost/market
structure interaction term coe¢ cients are negative, the coe¢ cient on the interaction
term is not statistically signi￿cant. All technology speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects are negative
and statistically signi￿cant.
The two CL models (I and II) are compared using a nested likelihood ratio test. A
test statistic of 75.74 is highly signi￿cant (see Table 4). This implies that accounting
22for systematic heterogeneity in response to changes in compliance costs improves the
￿t of the model.26
Random parameter logit results
Several di⁄erent speci￿cations of the RPL model were tested. The best results
were obtained when all cost coe¢ cients are allows to vary randomly. In the RPL
model presented in Table 3, the estimated standard deviations of all but one of the
random coe¢ cients are all highly signi￿cant, indicating that these parameters do
vary across managers, even after allowing for observed, systematic variation across
electricity market types and plant vintages. The results of a nested likelihood ratio
test imply that allowing for response heterogeneity dramatically improves the ￿t of
the model. These RPL estimation results are robust to various optimization routines
and initial starting values.
In the RPL model, unobserved variation is decomposed into an extreme value
stochastic term and variance of the random parameters. In the CL models, all unob-
served variation in anticipated costs is captured by the extreme value stochastic term.
Consequently, normalizing coe¢ cients by the variance of the extreme value compo-
nent of the disturbance term will make RPL parameters larger in absolute value. The
signi￿cant increase in the magnitude of the cost coe¢ cient estimates suggests that
the variation in random parameters constitutes a signi￿cant portion of the variance
in (unobserved) perceived compliance costs. Conversely, the technology speci￿c ￿xed
e⁄ects get smaller in absolute value, and some cease to be signi￿cant. This suggests
that the statistical signi￿cance of these ￿xed e⁄ects in the CL speci￿cations was partly
due to random response heterogeneity to variations in costs.
All of the cost coe¢ cients are assumed to be normally distributed.27 The means
of both the variable cost coe¢ cient and the variable cost/restructured market inter-
action term are negative and signi￿cant at the 1% level. The estimated standard
23deviations are also large in absolute value and statistically signi￿cant. This indicates
that there is random variation in response to changes in variable operating costs,
even after accounting for di⁄erences in response across units of di⁄erent vintages and
across electricity market types. In an e⁄ort to attribute some of this variation to ob-
servable plant characteristics, other interactions were also tested, but none improved
the ￿t of the model.
The negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient values on the two capital cost/age in-
teraction terms indicate ￿rst that more capital intensive strategies are less likely to
be adopted at older plants, and that when age is held constant, this coe¢ cient is
larger in absolute value among plant managers in restructured electricity markets.
Neither of the coe¢ cients on the capital cost constants are signi￿cant, although these
coe¢ cients vary signi￿cantly in both sub-populations.
Because these models are non-linear, the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms
involving the restructured electricity industry indicator variable and the capital (vari-
able) cost variable (in both the CL and the RPL models) are not equal to the marginal
e⁄ect of electricity industry regulation on the responsiveness to changes in capital
(variable) cost. To assess the e⁄ect of electricity industry regulation on managers￿re-
sponse to changes in costs, I compare the marginal e⁄ects implied by the RPL model
in the two di⁄erent electricity market types. 28 These marginal e⁄ects are calculated
for each unit.
Table 5 presents average interaction e⁄ects for the most frequently chosen NOx
control technologies. These estimates indicate that plant managers in restructured
markets are relatively more responsive to incremental changes in compliance costs.
For example, if the expected capital costs of SCR increase incrementally by $100,000,
the probability that this compliance alternative will be chosen decreases by approxi-
mately 0.008% in regulated markets and 0.014% in restructured markets. The mar-
24ginal e⁄ect of an incremental increase in the variable compliance costs of SCR on the
probability that SCR will be chosen is only 13% larger in restructured markets. In
percentage terms, the e⁄ect of electricity restructuring on the marginal e⁄ect of a
change in capital costs is greater than the corresponding e⁄ect of a change in vari-
able operating costs. A more formal statistical test of whether ￿rms in restructured
markets are relatively more biased against incurring higher capital costs is a work in
progress.
Elasticity calculations provide a more intuitive characterization of the respon-
siveness of compliance decisions to changes in compliance costs. Table 6 presents the
elasticities of choice probabilities with respect to both capital and variable compli-
ance costs for the most common compliance choices. Elasticities are calculated using
both the CL and RPL coe¢ cient estimates. The RPL model yields larger (in ab-
solute value) elasticity estimates for all compliance strategies, suggesting that the CL
model underestimates the responsiveness of compliance decisions to changes in com-
pliance costs. For example, if the expected capital cost of an SCR retro￿t increases
by 1%, the RPL model predicts that the probability that a manager will choose to
retro￿t his unit with SCR decreases by approximately 6% in regulated markets, and
approximately 11% in restructured electricity markets. The CL model predicts more
moderate decreases of 0.7% and 1.5% respectively. If anticipated variable costs in-
crease by 1%, the RPL model predicts that the probability of an SCR retro￿t would
decrease by 2% and 4% in regulated and restructured markets respectively. The CL
model predicts decreases of only -0.80% and -1%.
Summary and Next Steps
This paper presents evidence that economic regulation in electricity markets has sig-
ni￿cantly a⁄ected how electricity generators have chosen to comply with the NOx
25SIP Call. Unit level compliance cost estimates are generated using detailed data on
units￿technology and operating characteristics, operating costs, fuel inputs, etc. Two
types of discrete choice models of the compliance strategy choice are estimated: a
conditional logit model, and a random parameter logit model that allows the cost
coe¢ cients in the model to vary across units.
Results from both models suggest that compliance choices do di⁄er signi￿cantly
across restructured and more regulated electricity markets. Managers of generators
operating in restructured electricity markets are signi￿cantly more responsive to vari-
ation in compliance costs as compared to managers in regulated electricity markets
who are able to pass a signi￿cant portion of these costs through to electricity cus-
tomers.
With coe¢ cient estimates from the random parameter logit models in hand, a
logical next step involves deriving conditional distributions for unit speci￿c coe¢ -
cients and simulating the compliance decisions that coal plant managers would have
made had the NOx emissions market been designed to re￿ ect spatial heterogeneity in
marginal damages from pollution. A more complicated "exposure based" approach
to designing the permit market would have involved estimating the variability in
marginal damages resulting from increased ozone exposure in di⁄erent regions of the
regulated area. In order to set "trading ratios" to determine the terms of interregional
permit trading, estimated damages in each region are normalized by the damages in
a designated baseline region (Krupnick et al.). Because pollution permits carry more
currency in low damage areas, the introduction of trading ratios o⁄ers additional in-
centives to install pollution controls in relatively high damage areas. The magnitude
of this e⁄ect will depend on how responsive ￿rms compliance choices are to changes
in variable compliance costs
My approach will di⁄er from prior work29 on exposure based trading in two im-
26portant respects. First, previous studies have used very blunt measures of compliance
costs; conditional on boiler ￿ring type, capacity and capacity factor, all units are as-
sumed to face identical compliance costs. I use a much more detailed approach to
cost estimation in order to capture a larger proportion of the inter-unit variation
in expected compliance costs. Second, rather than using a deterministic, economic
model of the compliance choice that assumes that managers will choose the compli-
ance choice that minimizes estimated compliance costs, I use an econometric model
of the compliance choice. The economic models used in earlier studies do not allow
for asymmetric investment incentives across electricity markets, heterogeneity in the
responsiveness of plant managers to variation in compliance costs, intrinsic biases
for or against particular types of NOx controls or idiosyncratic errors on the part of
decision makers.
I have presented evidence here that all of these factors have played a signi￿-
cant role in the compliance decisions made by ￿rms. Equipped with more precise
cost estimates, and a more realistic model of how plant managers in di⁄erent elec-
tricity markets respond to variation in compliance costs, I will revisit the question of
whether an exposure based market design would have signi￿cantly a⁄ected the spatial
distribution of permitted emissions. These simulations are a work in progress.
27Appendix : Testing the Independence of Future Electricity Production
Levels and the Compliance Decision
I cannot directly observe plant managers￿expectations regarding ozone season produc-
tion levels Qn under di⁄erent compliance strategy scenarios. In the paper, I assume
that managers used past summer production levels to proxy for expected ozone season
production. This assumption is supported by production costing models of electric-
ity dispatch under NOx regulation (Leppitsch and Hobbs) and anecdotal evidence
that managers used past summer capacity factors to estimate future production lev-
els when choosing how to comply with the SIP Call, independent of the compliance
choice being evaluated (EPRI,1999).
Let ￿ Qn represent the nth unit￿ s average production in past ozone seasons. I now
assume:
Qni = ￿ Qn + ￿ni; (10)
where ￿ni is the di⁄erence between the unit￿ s historic average ozone season production
and its the quantity of electricity that the nth unit expects to produce in an average
ozone season, conditional on adopting compliance strategy i (Qni). For a baseload
unit with relatively low operating costs serving either a restructured or more regulated
electricity market, we can assume that ￿ni = 0 8 i: For units with higher operating
costs, however, future electricity production levels could be a⁄ected by the compliance
choice, and it is conceivable that managers took this into account in their compliance
decisions.
In the analysis presented in the paper, I assume ￿ni = 0 for all ￿rms, for all
compliance choices. One way to empirically test the validity of this assumption is
to test whether ￿rms￿production levels changed signi￿cantly once the NOx SIP Call
28began, and whether the magnitude and the direction of these changes are signi￿cantly
correlated with ￿rms￿compliance strategy choices. I estimate the following regression
equation using monthly, unit-level ozone season production data from 1997-2004:
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The quantity produced in month t by unit n is ~ Qnt:￿n is a unit speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect.
DSIP
nt is a dummy indicating that the NOx SIP Call market is "on"; this indicator
variable has an n subscript because the program came into e⁄ect in di⁄erent years for
di⁄erent subsets of plants. The SIP Call indicator variable is interacted with a series
of technology dummies indicating compliance strategy choices; ￿nj = 1 if the nth
￿rm chose compliance strategy j, 0 otherwise. A second set of interaction terms are
included that interact the SIP Call indicator and the compliance strategy indicators
with a dummy variable that indicates whether the unit is a non-baseload unit. A
superior speci￿cation would include a measure of market area load. Estimation of
this preferred model will be carried out when the load data become available.
This regression equation is estimated separately for restructured and regulated
markets. A signi￿cant amount of the variation in the dependent variable is explained
by the unit ￿xed e⁄ects and the SIP Call dummy. The coe¢ cient on the SIP Call
indicator variable is positive in both models, although imprecisely estimated. Both
SCR interaction terms are signi￿cant in both models. These results indicate that, on
average, units adopting SCR technology experienced a larger increase their production
on average, once the SIP Call took e⁄ect.
There is no way of knowing whether plant managers adjusted their production
expectations upwards when estimating the costs of an SCR retro￿t. If they did, the
estimate of variable operating cost I use will be an underestimate, and the added
29revenues associated with producing more electricity will be absorbed by the SCR
technology constant. I add an interaction between variable compliance cost and the
SCR indicator variable to see if this model ￿ts the data better. Adding this interac-
tion terms allows the coe¢ cient on variable compliance costs to be more negative in
strategies that incorporate an SCR retro￿t, to re￿ ect the fact that ￿ni might exceed
0 in these cases.
Estimation of the coe¢ cient on the newly included interaction term is confounded
by the signi￿cant correlation between this interaction term and the SCR ￿xed e⁄ect.
Whereas we would expect that the coe¢ cient on the SCR indicator variable should
become more positive (to re￿ ect additional pro￿ts associated with higher production
levels) and a negative coe¢ cient on the SCR/variable cost interaction, I ￿nd the
opposite. The SCR ￿xed e⁄ect coe¢ cient gets signi￿cantly more negative (-1.51)
whereas the interaction term coe¢ cient is signi￿cant and positive (0.59). Including
this interaction term does not improve the ￿t of the model.
These results favor a rejection of this more restrictive speci￿cation. Empirical
evidence suggests that the e⁄ect of a unit￿ s choice of compliance strategy on ozone
season production levels is signi￿cant for those choices involving SCR retro￿ts. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that managers did not take this relationship into account
when making their compliance decisions. Attempts to account for the possibility
that managers might have anticipated higher future production levels conditional on
adopting SCR to not improve the ￿t of the model.
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37Figure 2 : Estimated Compliance Costs for a 500 MW Boiler
Strategy Technology lbs NOx/mmBtu
N No Retro￿t 0.42
SN Selective Non-Catalytic Reduction (SNCR) 0.34
CM Combustion Modi￿cation 0.33
L1 Low NOx Burners with over￿re air option 1 0.31
L2 Low NOx Burners with over￿re air option 2 0.28
L3 Low NOx Burners with over￿re air options 1&2 0.26
SC Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) 0.13
L3S L3 + SCR 0.11
38Combustion Modifications No Retrofit
Low NOx Burners SNCR
SCR
Figure 3: Compliance Choices of Units in Regulated Markets
Combustion Modifications No Retrofit
Low NOx Burners SNCR
SCR
Figure 4: Compliance Choices of Units in Restructured Markets
39Table 1. Summary Statistics by Electricity Market Type1
Variable Restructured Regulated
# Units 302 286
# Facilities 109 99
Capacity (MW) 277 273
(245) (266)
Pre-retro￿t NOx emissions (lbs/mmBtu) 0.51 0.55
(0.20) (0.23)
Pre-retro￿t summer capacity factor (%) 64 67
(16) (14)
Pre-retro￿t heat rate (kWh/btu) 11,378 11,536
(2176) (1739)
Unit Age (years) 43 42
(11) (11)
1Summary statistics generated using the data from the 588 units used to estimate the model.
40Table 2: Compliance Cost Summary Statistics for Commonly Selected Control
Technologies
Capital Cost Per kWh
operating costs
Technology ($/kW) (cents/kWh)
Restructured Regulated Restructured Regulated
Combustion 12.71 12.38 0.94 1.05
Modi￿cation (4.89) (4.17) (0.38) (0.38)
Low NOx 25.01 27.16 0.72 0.74
Burners (12.73) (19.11) (0.26) (0.22)
SNCR 16.16 19.21 0.97 1.02
(14.57) (22.82) (0.41) (0.38)
SCR 70.55 73.40 0.51 0.54
(21.10) (26.04) (0.31) (0.20)
41Table 3. Conditional and Random Parameters Logit Results
CLI CLII RPL
Technology Fixed E⁄ects
￿SNCR -1.91** -1.86** -0.94*
(0.30) (0.30) (0.40)
￿SCR -0.97** -0.55** 0.82**
(0.19) (0.20) (0.38)
￿CM -1.77** -1.77** -1.18
(0.29) (0.28) (0.38)
￿OFA -1.70** -1.64** -1.45**
(0.35) (0.33) (0.42)
￿LNC1 -1.59** -1.41** -0.13
(0.33) (0.53) (0.51)
￿LNC2 -2.27** -2.15** -0.67
(0.42) (0.44) (0.56)
￿LNC3 -2.31** -2.36** -1.84**
(0.53) (0.53) (0.57)
￿LNB -0.40 -0.44** -0.27
(0.39) (0.43) (0.50)
Cost Variables
Annual operating cost (V) -0.30** -0.33** -0.80**
($100,000) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15)
￿V ￿ -0.90**
(0.16)
V*Restructured ￿ -0.01 -0.51**
(0.07) (0.16)
￿V R ￿ 0.69**
(0.13)
Capital cost (K) -0.08** 0.01 0.21
($100,000) (0.01) (0.04 (0.14)
￿K ￿ ￿ 0.15**
(0.05)
K*Restructured ￿ 0.04 0.16
(0.04) (0.23)
￿KR ￿ ￿ 0.48**
(0.10)








Log-likelihood -955.04 -917.16 -783.61
Robust standard errors are in brackets. The age interaction variables are scaled by 0.1.
*Indicates signi￿cance at 5%. **Indicates signi￿cance at 1%.
42Table 4: Measures of Data Fit
Technology ￿xed e⁄ects only CLI CLII RPL
Log-likelihood value -1008.10 955.04 917.17 783.61
at convergence
Number of parameters 8 10 14 20
LR test statistic ￿ 106.12 75.74 267.12
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Table 5: Average Capital Cost and Variable Compliance Cost
Marginal E⁄ects for Commonly Selected Technologies(RPL)
Technology Capital cost marginal e⁄ects Variable cost marginal e⁄ects
Regulated Restructured Regulated Restructured
CM -0.051 -0.090 -0.072 -0.109
LNB -0.125 -0.204 -0.147 -0.246
SCR -0.008 -0.013 -0.043 -0.049
SNCR -0.045 -0.075 -0.081 -0.119
Table 6: Elasticities of Choice Probabilities with Respect to Capital Cost
for Commonly Selected Technologies
Technology CLI RPL
Regulated Restructured Regulated Restructured
CM -0.12 -0.55 -0.99 -1.70
LNB -0.18 -0.32 -1.40 -2.29
SCR -0.67 -1.46 -6.22 -10.76
SNCR -0.14 -0.22 -1.05 -1.76
Table 7: Elasticities of Choice Probabilities with Respect to Variable Compliance
Costs for Commonly Selected Technologies
Technology CLI RPL
Regulated Restructured Regulated Restructured
CM -1.33 -1.43 -3.17 -5.22
LNB -1.11 -1.23 -2.53 -4.02
SCR -0.79 -1.14 -2.20 -3.76
SNCR -2.13 -2.19 -4.65 -7.40
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1Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and the University of California Energy
Institute. I would like to thank Severin Borenstein, Michael Hanemann, Guido Imbens, Je⁄rey
Perlo⁄ and Catherine Wolfram for helpful suggestions. I am indebted to Ed Cichanowicz, Bonnie
Courtemanche, Joe Diggins, Nichole Edraos, Thomas Feeley, Richard Himes, Allan Kukowski, Bruce
Lani, Dan Musatti, John Pod, Galen Richards, David Roth, Ravi Srivastava, Donald Tonn, Chad
Whiteman and David Wojichowski for providing data and helping me understand the technical
side of electricity generation and NOx control; without their help, this project would not have been
possible. I also thank the UC Energy Institute for ￿nancial support. All remaining errors are mine.
2All of the emissions regulated under the Acid Rain Program and over 90% of the emissions
regulated under the NOx SIP Call come from electricity generators. The mercury cap and trade
program laid out in the EPA￿ s mercury rule, published in May 2005, applies exclusively to the
electricity sector.
3The paper focuses exclusively on the compliance decisions of coal-￿red electricity generators.
Although only 31% of the units regulated under the SIP Call are coal plants, the majority of the
point source NOx emissions in the region comes from coal plants. Over 80% of permits were allocated
to coal plants in 2004.
4NOx reacts with carbon monoxide and volatile organic compounds (such as hydrocarbons and
methane) in the presence of sunlight to form ozone in the lower atmosphere.
5Coal plants in 9 Northeastern states had to achieve compliance by May 2003; plants in the
southeastern states had to comply by May 2004.
6For want of a better term, I use the word "regulated" to refer to those electricity markets that
have not been restructured. This is misleading in the sense that wholesale electricity markets are
arguably subject to more regulation once restructuring takes hold.
7In many of the states that have chosen not to restructure their electricity industries, "incentive"
or "performance based" regulation (PBR) has replaced more traditional "rate of return" regulation.
PBR is a broadly de￿ned concept that includes any regulatory mechanism that attempts to link
pro￿ts to desired performance objectives (such as improved operating e¢ ciency, improved environ-
mental performance and rational procurement decisions). Under most forms of PBR, Regulators
continue to set baseline revenue requirements as a function of prudently incurred costs. See Knittel
for an assessment of how incentive based regulation has a⁄ected generator e¢ ciency.
8See Lile and Burtraw for a compilation of PUC cost recovery rules and actions that were in place
during the years when utilities were making ARP compliance investment decisions (1990-1995).
9Of the 19 states that are a⁄ected by the NOx SIP Call, 12 have restructured their electricity
industries: CT, DE, IL, MA, MD, MI, NJ, NY, OH, PA, RI and VA. The remaining 7 chose not to
go forwards with restructuring: AL, IN, KY, NC, SC, TN, WV.
10A discussion of how these cost estimates are generated is included in the following section.
11These calculations assume perfect compliance and a permit cost of $2.25/lb NOx. This was the
average futures permit price (per lb NOx) in the years leading up to the SIP Call. Permits started
trading in early 2001 in anticipation of the SIP Call Rule.
12For example, for this particular plant, a manager will not want to adopt "L3"; while this choice
would incur roughly the same capital costs as "CL1", expected variable compliance costs would be
signi￿cantly higher.
13I assume that anticipated electricity production is independent of the compliance strategy choice.
Production cost modeling has indicated that the e⁄ects of NOx regulation on electricity generation
dispatch are small (Farrell et al.). Anecdotal evidence suggestt that plant managers have used past
ozone season production to proxy for expected production, regardless of the compliance strategy
being evaluated (EPRI). This assumption is discussed in more detail in the Appendix.
14Trackers are mechanisms that allow the utility to recover its "tracked" expenses by adjusting its
rates accordingly. These trackers reduce the frequency of general rate cases and signi￿cantly reduce
44the likelihood of failing to recover costs associated with volatile inputs, such as fuel, emissions permits
or environmental construction work.
15Kentucky￿ s environmental surcharge law gives utilities the assurance that they will fully recover
the capital and operating costs associated with environmental compliance, and North Carolina￿ s
"Clean Smokestacks" bill allowed two utilities that serve North and South Carolina to freeze their
retail rates for ￿ve years in order to cover the costs of reducing NOx emissions.
16It is worth noting that ￿rms will not be compensated for the opportunity cost of using the
permits they have been allocated to o⁄set their emissions; they can only recover some portion
(1 ￿ ￿
v) of their net permit purchase through higher rates.
17These are the New York ISO, the New England ISO and the "PJM" (Pennsylvania Jersey
Maryland) ISO.
18Downgrades outnumbered upgrades 65 to 20 in 2000; that ratio was up to 182 to 15 in 2002.
In 2003, 18 percent of ￿rms were non-investment grade (Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources).
19There has been at least one case of an independent power producer cancelling plans to install
SCR and choosing instead to rely on less capital intensice compliance options in order to improve
cash ￿ ows in the near term (2003-2005) (Platts Utility Environment Report 2002).
20The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) is an organization that was created and is funded
by public and private electric utilities to conduct electricity related R&D.
21Anecdotal evidence suggests that this software has been used not only by plant managers,
but also by regulators to evaluate proposed compliance costs for the utilities they regulate(Himes,
Musatti, Srivastra).
22Units in these two di⁄erent groups were equipped with very similar NOx controls when the SIP
Call was promulgated. Over 80% of capacity in both types of markets had some type of low NOx
burners. Over 5% of capacity in restructured markets and over 7% of capacity in regulated markets
had installed some type of combution modi￿cation or over￿re air ports. Only 1% of capacity in
restructured markets had been retro￿t with SCR as of 2000, no SCR retro￿ts had taken place in
regulated markets.
23For example, the :"LNC1", "LNC2" and "LNC3" options are only appropriate for tangentially
￿red boilers.
24Another advantage of the RPL model is that it relaxes the assumption that the unobserved
component of Cni is iid; unobserved components of anticipated compliance costs are represented in
the model as a combination of the standard iid extreme value term and the random component of the
coe¢ cients. This induces correlations in the unobserved components across compliance alternatives,
which in turn allows for ￿ exible substitution patterns between compliance choices.
25Other speci￿cations were also examined, but provided worse results than the speci￿cation pre-
sented here.
26Interaction terms were added sequentially to the model and individual nested LR tests were
carried out. In each case, test statistics indicated that each of the four interaction terms belong in
the model.
27It is common in the literature to assume that cost coe¢ cients are lognormally distributed,
so as to ensure the a priori expected negative domain for the distribution (costs enter the model
as negative numbers). Hensher and Greene(2002) discuss some of the drawbacks of assuming a
lognormal distribution. Log-normal speci￿cations for the variable compliance cost coe¢ cients were
tested, but resulted in a failure to reach convergence.
28For example, the e⁄ect of an incremental change in capital costs on choice probabilities in a























The same approach is used to calculate the marginal a⁄ects of changes in variable compliance
costs.
29 Research that considers the merits of ozone-exposure based permit trading is limited. Farrell
et al. develop a dynamic, linear programming model of the NOx Budget Program, a smaller NOx
emissions trading program that predated the SIP Call. They address a variety of permit market
design issues, including whether to impose geographic constraints on permit trading so as to prevent
undesirable spatial patterns of permitted emissions between pre-determined zones. They conclude
that the bene￿ts associated with geographically constrained permit trading (1-2% change in the
spatial pattern of emissions) do not justify the costs. In a more recent paper, Krupnick et al.
use a regional atmospheric model of the eastern United States to estimate point source trading
ratios. They compare an emissions based NOx trading program with an exposure based scenario
and conclude that there is no clear bene￿t to a spatially di⁄erentiated trading policy.
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